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Human Rights and Relativism 
 
Colleen Good 
 
 
As a concept, human rights has a long history within 
Western thought. The term itself, however, only came into 
common usage beginning in the 20th century. It serves as 
both a legal and philosophical concept, and as such its 
definition is complex. By definition, human rights are 
supposed to be universally applicable. Some universalists 
argue that human rights as laid out by current human rights 
law embodies universal ideals and rights that are universally 
relevant and applicable to all people. However, some 
relativists have challenged this idea, pointing out that ethical 
systems develop in the context of local cultures and that 
universal applicability should not be assumed. Within 
relativism, there are two stances: first, the more extreme 
strong relativist view is that there is no such thing as 
universal human rights, as all beliefs and values are 
culturally relative and therefore apply only within certain 
cultures. Second, the less extreme weak relativist view states 
that, while ethical systems do come out of particular cultural 
settings, this does not mean that these ethical systems do not 
share some overlap—therefore a comprehensive human 
rights doctrine may be possible.  
In this paper I will be evaluating the conflicting ideas 
of human rights as universal and human rights as relative. I 
will begin with a discussion of the concept of human rights. 
Then I will examine the term “cultural relativism” in 
general, followed by a discussion of what cultural relativism 
says about human rights. Next I will examine the different 
types of cultural relativism discussed in Fernando R.  
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Téson’s article called “International Human Rights and 
Cultural Relativism.”1 I will evaluate the different types of 
relativism elaborated on by Téson, ultimately arguing that 
while strong relativism is unfeasible, weak relativism is 
something that we should take seriously and examine more 
closely in our discussion on human rights. Weak relativism 
not only allows for a human rights regime, but it also 
actually furthers the discussion on the applicability and 
content of human rights. 
 
Human Rights   
 
Philosophically, human rights talk has its roots in 
western philosophical and political thought.  Julia Ching 
characterizes the major influences on human rights as the 
following: liberal moral and political philosophy (in 
particular liberal English thought and the French 
enlightenment), international law, and the American and 
French revolutions of the late eighteenth century (Ching 68). 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), whose 
main author was a Frenchman named René Cassin, was 
actually directly modeled after the values of the French 
Revolution, with the twenty-seven articles divided among 
the four pillars of “dignity, liberty, equality, and 
brotherhood” (Ishay 3). In her book The History of Human 
Rights: from Ancient Times to the Globalization Era, 
Micheline Ishay acknowledges that the modern conception 
of human rights is mostly European in origin. She also states 
that one of the largest debates within the human rights 
community is the universalist/ cultural relativist debate, and  
                                                
1 Téson , Fernando R. “International Human Rights and Cultural 
Relativism” in The Philosophy of Human Rights, 409-423. ed. Patrick 
Hayden. St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2001.  
  29 
 
that to communicate effectively within that discussion, one 
must properly know human rights’ history and human rights’ 
philosophic roots (Ishay 10-11).  In Anthony Pagden’s 
article “Human Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe’s 
Imperial Legacy,” Pagden argues that the concept of human 
rights comes from an understanding of natural rights with 
roots in the goal of justifying imperialist regimes, and that 
with the French Revolution, understandings of human rights 
became connected to the idea of citizenship (Pagden 171).  
Legally, the three major modern human rights law 
documents are the following: the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) 1948; the Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (1966); and the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966). The UDHR is generally 
seen as the start and foundation of current human rights 
discourse and its political structure. The subsequent 
documents are seen as complementary to that document, 
adding to the rights listed in the UDHR, addressing rights 
not previously laid out in the UDHR. Therefore, I will be 
examining the issue of rights using these documents as the 
modern political authority on human rights. Because I am 
examining human rights in its current legal manifestation, 
looking at human rights as articulated by these three 
documents rather than only through arguments and 
statements given by specific philosophers is necessary. 
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights defines human rights as “rights inherent to all 
human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, 
sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or 
any other status. We are all equally entitled to our human 
rights without discrimination. These rights are all  
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interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.”2 In addition, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “all 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should 
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”3 
 International law’s role in the human rights 
discussion truly came into play with the creation of such 
human rights treaties, many formed under the United 
Nations, with many ratified by more than three quarters of 
the world’s countries.  
As stated earlier, the idea of human rights came from 
Western philosophical and political thought, and modern 
human rights discourse has its roots in these western ideas. 
The same ideas that influenced documents such as the 
Declaration for Independence, with its emphasis on the 
ideals of individualism and freedom, can be found in the 
foundational ideas of human rights (Ching 68). With these 
roots, it is clear that the language found in human rights 
discourse is culturally specific to the West. This is not to say 
that other cultures do not have any ideas that could be 
compatible with some sort of human rights framework, but it 
is important to acknowledge that in its current form, human 
rights discourse is not necessarily framed in a way that all 
cultures would identify with or find acceptable.  
 
                                                
2 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
“What are human rights?” United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees,   
3 UN General Assembly, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 10 December 
1948, 217 A (III), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3712c.html. 
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Some argue that the philosophic roots of human 
rights are insignificant: as human rights are universal, so are 
the ideas upon which they are founded (Ching 70). 
However, human rights were not even portrayed as 
universals in the West until relatively recently. Documents 
that are cited as espousing older human rights ideals, such as 
the Magna Carta or the American Declaration of 
Independence, exclude many, giving explicit rights only to 
men. In addition, before the seventeenth century, rights were 
given to rulers and religious figures, while the common 
people only had duties to their superiors (Ching 68). As 
ideas of human rights developed in the West, eventually 
both Western philosophic and political circles agreed that 
human rights should be universal. However, this same 
gradual development of ideas did not occur in other areas of 
the world. This lack of historic parallels to ideas of universal 
human rights in the non-Western world is part of the reason 
for opposition to assertions of its universalism.  
According to current human rights philosophical and 
legal discourse, human rights are argued to be by nature 
universal, in part to justify and ensure their universal 
application. Human rights are supposed to be rights that we 
possess by virtue of being human. As all humans worldwide 
share in their humanness, it is thought they must also share 
their right to human rights. However, even if there were an 
agreement on having human rights apply universally, it 
would not mean that there was universal agreement on the 
content of those rights. Some take the very existence of 
human rights documents and treaties as an indication of 
international agreement on the content of human rights. 
However, when one looks at where these rights are primarily 
articulated (the United Nations), the problems with this 
assertion become clear.  
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While the United Nations does claim to be an 
organization that, due to its collaborative nature, speaks for 
the countries of the world without regional prejudice, due to 
the United Nations’ history and structural organization, this 
is not always the case. Looking at the world political stage at 
the time when the United Nations was founded reveals that 
there existed a decidedly Western political bias in the world 
political arena. Due to power politics at play then (and now), 
it can hardly be said that views espoused under discussions 
within that body realistically reflect the true views of the 
governments involved let alone the people represented by 
those governments. Looking at the Permanent Five in the 
Security Council, Western interests are disproportionately 
represented: the US, the UK, France, and Russia are veto-
carrying members, while the only non-Western 
representative with veto power is China. With no veto-
members from South America or Africa, and a 
disproportionate representation by the west, the Security 
Council can hardly claim balance.4   
With power politics taken into consideration, the 
question emerges: are current human rights treaties voicing 
primarily Western values and political concerns without 
properly taking into account the concerns of other groups? 
Or, even worse, is the current human rights regime another 
less direct form of colonialism, giving Western states an 
excuse to meddle in the political affairs of other nations? 
While I will not be arguing anything as extreme as the  
 
                                                
4 While it is true that at the time the United Nations was formed, Russia 
was decidedly different from much of the rest of the Western world, 
historically it still has strong Western roots and has interacted primarily 
with the Western world. However you count Russia, the West still has a 
disproportionate number of permanent members in the Security Council. 
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second point in this paper, it deserves to be mentioned that 
this point has been argued.  
Taking into account the fact that different 
civilizations may have different conceptions of human 
rights, one question that may be asked is how a consensus 
can be reached on this issue. In “A World Consensus on 
Human Rights?” Charles Taylor argues that one of the first 
obstacles to a consensus on human rights is the language 
used. As he says “rights talk has roots in Western culture. 
This is not to say that something very like the underlying 
norms expressed in schedules of rights don’t turn up 
elsewhere. But they are not expressed in this language” 
(Taylor 15). He continues by stating that we run into 
problems of terminology, with terminology being either too 
culturally specific or too vague to be useful, giving the 
examples of “dignity” as a Western-based term, and “well-
being” as a more widely culturally applicable term that is too 
vague.  
 While the Western-oriented language of the human 
rights discourse is recognized, some question this fact’s 
significance. As a larger question, is the difference only in 
the language, or are the very conceptions of human rights 
different, or even incompatible? Are there non-Western 
conceptions of human rights that are distinct from Western 
conceptions, and if so, how do we use them to further the 
discussion on human rights?  
 Relativists were among the first to bring up these 
issues. By examining relativism and the relativist-
universalist debate more closely, we will be able to see the 
roots of these debates, and can question the significance of 
them more effectively. The very basis of the relativist-
universalist debate is the significance of cultural variation in 
human rights discourse. So, to answer the question of  
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compatibility, we will first examine the idea of cultural 
relativism. Before beginning this section, it is important to 
note that, while cultural relativism is now recognized as a 
philosophical concept, its origins lie in the field of 
anthropology, and so my examination of cultural relativism 
begins with an examination of its anthropological roots. 
 
Cultural Relativism 
 
 Discussions of cultural relativism first began in 1901 
with Franz Boas’s work in the field of anthropology with the 
publication of the article “The Mind of Primitive Man.”5 In 
this article, Boas argued that anthropology as a discipline 
must change how it goes about doing ethnography in order 
to allow anthropologists to better understand the cultures 
they study. He stated that anthropologists should try to strip 
themselves of all traces of cultural influence from the area in 
which they were born in order to better place themselves 
within the mindset of the people of the culture they were 
studying. He also stated that the differences between 
cultures were not biological, which helped further arguments 
against colonialism and ideas of Western cultural 
superiority. While the claim that one could strip away one’s 
cultural identity was quickly dismissed, Boas’s ideas caused 
anthropologists to examine their own cultural identities and 
preconceptions more critically before studying other 
cultures, and created the idea that all beliefs are culturally 
relative and should not be judged outside of their own 
cultural realm.  
 
                                                
5 Boas, Franz: “The Mind of Primitive Man.” Science, Vol. 13, No. 321 
(Feb. 22, 1901): 281-289.  
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 Modern cultural relativism comes in many different 
forms, from claims which are more extreme to less so. Some 
cultural relativists claim that all beliefs and ethical systems 
are culturally relative, and that therefore there are no 
universal moral ideals. Some then argue that no one can be 
judged outside of their ethical system, while others just 
argue that we should try to be more aware of the fact that, 
while we can criticize others, we are doing it from within 
our own cultural ethical framework, without a higher 
justification for our views. This creates issues for those who 
want to be able to make objective criticisms of a culture’s 
actions.   
Without being able to objectively criticize other 
cultures’ ethical practices, the worry that many of Boas’s 
contemporaries expressed was that no one could be justified 
in doing anything about atrocities such as those committed 
by the Nazi’s. Margaret Mead, one of Boas’s students, 
argued that because Nazism did not survive as a culture for 
three generations, it did not count as a culture. But this 
argument seems less than satisfactory, and brings up the 
difficult question: what exactly is a “culture’? How do we 
distinguish between different cultures? And with the 
continuing fragmentation and overlap of identities and 
cultures created by an increase in inter-global travel and 
communication, how do we weigh these different cultures, 
and is a comprehensive dialogue about these cultures 
coherent at all? Some aspects of theses questions will be 
examined later in this paper, particularly as they relate to 
Asia, but essentially what it boils down to is proper 
definition. While it is true that any definition of a group of 
people is ultimately a simplification (and possibly arbitrary), 
as long as that definition is properly outlined, defended, and 
consistently used, the problem becomes less overwhelming. 
  36 
 
Cultural Relativism and Human Rights  
 
Cultural Relativism and Anthropology 
The first time when cultural relativism and human 
rights intersect seems to be the “Statement on Human 
Rights” given by the Executive Board of the American 
Anthropological Association to the United Nations (per their 
request) in 1947, one year prior to “the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights” developed by the United 
Nations. In this statement, it becomes clear that there was a 
lot of skepticism within the American Anthropological 
Association (AAA) as to the political intent behind human 
rights. In the statement, the need for the respect of the 
differences among cultures is emphasized, and the statement 
warns of the dangers of stressing absolute values, as this can 
lead to doctrines like the “white man’s burden”—a concept 
used for centuries to excuse Western countries’ colonization 
and exploitation of countries around the world. The 1947 
AAA statement is very entrenched in its times; during this 
period, the negative effects of colonialism were still very 
fresh in the common consciousness. The idea that some 
cultures were more “advanced” than others was used to 
excuse oppression by Western governments. Therefore, the 
AAA tried to emphasize the merits found in different 
cultures, while at the same time stressing that an appeal to 
universal ideals could be dangerous, if exploited in the same 
ways as modernization and social Darwinism by Western 
governments during the colonial period.  
Another statement was given by the Association in 
1999 that seems to depart from the original1949 statement in 
many ways, foremost in its support of human rights. Karen 
Engle suggests in “From Skepticism to Embrace: Human 
Rights and the American Anthropological Association from  
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1947- 1999” that, while attitudes about human rights had 
changed within the AAA between 1947 and 1999, attitudes 
about relativism had not. Engle suggests that human rights 
had proven to have less negative consequences than the 
AAA had originally thought. With less government 
corruption evident than the corruption the AAA had 
witnessed in the early to mid twentieth century, the AAA 
was able to feel more comfortable backing a human rights 
system, while still cautioning against discrimination based 
on the diversity of other cultures. 
Engle states that anthropologists must figure out 
where to place the limits on the tolerance advocated through 
cultural relativism. Engle does recognize the importance of 
cultural protection and tolerance advocated by the relativist 
stance, but believes steps should be taken to reconcile it with 
the universalist human rights position. 
 
Cultural Relativism and Philosophy 
While anthropologists may have started many 
aspects of the discussion on relativism and human rights, 
philosophers have also written a great deal on the subject. It 
is important at this point to make distinctions among the 
different types of relativism, as some are more useful than 
others in furthering the discussion on human rights.   
 
 
Fernando R. Téson: the Case for International Human 
Rights Law 
 
With that in mind, this paper will now examine the 
arguments put forth by Fernando R. Téson in his article 
“International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism.” 
Téson states that cultural relativism is not a legal term, but is  
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instead historically derived from anthropology and moral 
philosophy (as we have previously discussed). He 
acknowledges that cultural relativism can take multiple 
forms and states that he will attempt to anticipate arguments 
that could be made by any of a variety of types of cultural 
relativism.  
For the purposes of the debate about international 
human rights, Téson defines cultural relativism as the 
following: “the position according to which local cultural 
traditions (including religious, political, and legal practices) 
properly determine the existence and scope of civil and 
political rights enjoyed by individuals in a given society” 
(Téson 380). He then states that relativists believe that there 
are no “transboundary legal or moral standards” (380), the 
result being that substantive human rights standards vary, 
reflecting the conventions of each culture. An alternative 
relativist view, he states, says instead that although a 
substantive human rights doctrine could exist as customary 
or conventional international law, the meaning of this human 
rights doctrine would vary from culture to culture.  
The difference between these two relativist stances is 
great, as the second will allow for a human rights doctrine 
while the first will not. The first relativist stance not only 
does not allow for transboundary standards, it does not even 
seem to allow for any kind of substantive international law. 
This is a very problematic stance to take in our current 
international political culture, and seems to question the 
meaning and significance of international treaties on smaller 
scales as well. By contrast, the second relativist view allows 
for human rights doctrine, but simply wishes to emphasize 
tolerance for different cultural interpretations of that 
doctrine.  
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Later in his article, Téson spells out three additional 
types of relativism. These types are not specifically linked to 
human rights discourse, but to relativism in general, and are 
a different way of dividing relativist ideas.  
The first type is descriptive relativism. It states that 
different societies have different ideas of right and wrong. 
This view, he says, is mainly supported by relativist 
anthropologists. For the sake of the argument he is going to 
give, he is willing to accept descriptive relativism as valid. 
Looking at the many variations in legal and ethical traditions 
worldwide, I think descriptive relativism clearly holds some 
truth. Even within cultures, we have debates on the ethics of 
particular situations, so clearly we are not in universal 
agreement over ethics. 
Metaethical relativism is the second type, and it 
states that it is impossible to discover moral truth. A milder 
form, he says, would argue that there is no valid means of 
moral reasoning that could argue to be as well justified as 
the scientific method. This form is in some ways arguing 
against universalism, though it is saying that it is impossible 
to discover moral truth, not specifically that such truth does 
not exist at all.  
The third type is called normative relativism, and 
states that what a person ought to do and what rights that 
person has are culturally dependent. He states that 
metaethical relativists, unlike normative relativists, have the 
option of attempting to adopt a “reflective equilibrium,” as 
argued by John Rawls, by checking moral intuitions against 
moral principles. In addition, Téson argues that descriptive 
and metaethical relativism do not logically entail normative 
relativism. Normative relativism is the type of relativism 
that Téson discusses in the rest of his paper (384). 
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Téson argues that relativists must respond to the 
argument for universalizability in one of two ways. First, a 
relativist could state that being a part of a different 
community is a “morally relevant circumstance” (386), 
giving the relativist the ability to claim that universalism is 
still being maintained, just counting culture as a part of the 
circumstance of the situation.  
He states the relativist would use this to argue that, 
with this being true, universalizability would still hold, even 
while granting different individuals from different cultures 
different basic rights. He also states that some relativists 
would claim that the difference here is between abstract and 
concrete rights, with the relativist position serving as an 
attack on abstract rights.  
His argument against this is simple: being a part of a 
particular social group or community isn’t a morally relevant 
circumstance because where someone is born and their 
cultural environment are not related to their moral worth or 
entitlement to human rights. No one chooses where they are 
born. “If the moral conditions are not morally 
distinguishable, the requirements of universalizability fully 
applies to statements about individual rights, even where 
agents are immersed in different cultural environments” 
(387). Finally, he states that relativists confuse the 
circumstances under which one learns moral concepts with 
the concepts’ meaning.  
While his statement that it shouldn’t matter where 
someone is born may seem compelling, it could be argued 
that, in part, the phrasing of his comment is to blame. His 
statement reflects the American idea of everyone being able 
to achieve what they want regardless of starting 
circumstance, or the “American Dream.” However, this 
argument seems to water-down the arguments made by  
  41 
 
relativists. His argument seems to assume a universal set of 
rights, with relativists arguing that some people have more 
of this ultimate list than others.  
A relativist would have a more nuanced view of 
rights, with no universal ultimate list. Instead, people from 
different circumstances would give different rights different 
implications, and different groups could have lists that 
looked radically different, or strikingly similar. There would 
not be more or less participation in a universal human rights 
ideal, as there wouldn’t be a universal human rights ideal (at 
least, in the version of relativism he is arguing against here).  
In addition, his statement that relativists confuse 
circumstances with meaning seems to miss the nuances and 
complexity found in relativist discourse. The meaning of any 
term has different connotations depending upon language, 
cultural heritage, and personal experience. To water this 
down to a simple initial learning condition seems to dilute 
the true difference in meaning found among different 
cultures in regards to terminology and vocabulary.  
An example of this more specifically within human 
rights discourse would be the idea of “liberty” or even the 
idea of a “person.” Depending on the cultural connotations 
given to the words (given the words’ use historically within 
the culture, and connotations that result from lingual 
similarities to other words), the words may have very 
different meanings and ethical implications. 
He states that the second objection a relativist would 
raise against universalism is a logic-based one. He states that 
a relativist would argue that (a) the relativist’s only principle 
states that culture determines human rights and (b) that 
principle (a) is universal. Téson then counters this argument 
by saying that (a) is not a substantive moral statement, and 
that the requirement of universalizability only applies to  
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substantive moral statements. While it is true that strong 
relativists would claim that culture determines human rights, 
I don’t know that all forms of relativist would, or that this is 
necessarily what we should take from the relativist stance. A 
more important thing to take from it is that culture helps 
determine the initial concepts and ideas upon which human 
rights are founded, and that these ideas and the differences 
between them should be taken into consideration in attempts 
to identify a truly universal system of human rights.  
Next, Téson argues against normative relativism by 
stating that normative relativism does not follow the idea 
that “persons have moral worth qua persons and must be 
treated as ends in themselves, not as functions in the ends of 
others” (388). In the paragraph following that statement, 
Téson argues that we should not allow cultural standards of 
oppressive authoritarian regimes to limit human rights.  
In this argument, Téson seems to take the relativist 
position as the relativist position as argued by repressive 
governments. However, this seems an unfair 
characterization. If one looks at the history of relativism and 
the other ideas espoused by it, the most important part of 
relativism seems to be its commitment to tolerance. This 
does not necessitate a defense of abusive practices by 
governments—again as seen in the history of relativism and 
human rights, this is something that relativists have spent a 
good deal of energy actively trying to avoid. It seems his 
argument was begging the question, using a form of 
relativism that few relativists would recognize as such, 
instead of critiquing forms of relativism that are more 
difficult to argue against. 
In his paper, Téson sets out two assumptions he is 
making about human rights law (which he says have their 
foundations in international law): (1) he states that human  
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rights are a part of international law not only by treaty but 
also by customary law, and (2) he states that within human 
rights law there exists an obligation to “respect the cultural 
identities of peoples, their local traditions, and customs” 
(382).  
He states that his main thesis also has two parts: (i) 
“If there is an international human rights standard—the 
exact scope of which is admittedly difficult to ascertain—
then its meaning remains uniform across borders” (381) and 
(ii) “if there is a possibility of meaningful moral discourse 
about rights, then it is universal in nature and applies to all 
cultural beings despite cultural differences” (382).  
He then states that a “core” human rights law can be 
found by looking at a combination of human rights treaties 
and diplomatic practice. He calls human rights treaties’ 
uniformity “surprising” (382). He states that one large 
challenge for human rights remains the balance between 
human rights law and state sovereignty. While strict 
enforcement measures do not really exist, political pressure 
has gotten “remarkable results” (383).  
Before continuing with the rest of Téson’s article, I 
would like to comment on his basic assumptions and goals. 
First, Téson believes that, as human rights discourse has 
been going on for many decades, it can now be said to be a 
part of customary law. I don’t know that one could really 
argue this to be the case. Customary international law is 
defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross as 
unwritten law that is shown to be reflected in state practice. 
It must be shown that the international community views 
this practice as “required as a matter of law.”6 If some  
                                                
6 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Customary international 
humanitarian law,” International Review of the Red Cross, 
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countries have contrary practices, the practice can still count 
as customary law if that “contrary practice is condemned by 
other states or denied by the government itself.”7 
Looking at the many occurrences world-wide of 
events which would be classified as human rights abuses 
under the current system, and the general lack of unified 
legal international response to these events, I would say that 
governments hardly treat human rights law as “customary,” 
but instead as a thing to be worried about at their 
convenience (not a priority, unless it includes political or 
economic gain). Just talking about human rights does not 
make the current human rights framework customary law: 
action must also occur, and more consistently than it has so 
far. This very lack of consensus through the actions of the 
international community seems to suggest that the current 
human rights framework should be more closely evaluated.  
Second, while it is true that the human rights 
documents do attempt at respect for local cultures and 
customs, the concern remains that the very language used in 
the documents (derived as it is from western ways of 
thinking) imposes culturally specific, insensitive ideas under 
the guise of claims to universality. As Taylor argued in his 
aforementioned article, word choice is very important, and 
words can convey more than intended, and can (intentionally 
or not) cut certain people and ideas out of the conversation. 
Disagreements exist on concepts even as basic as what the 
human person is, and should be further examined to ensure 
that when we discuss human rights, we are all talking about 
the same thing. 
 
                                                
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_customary
_humanitarian_law. 
7 Ibid. 
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Next, Téson also states that any international human 
rights standard must have uniform meaning across borders, 
and that to have a meaningful moral discourse on rights, 
rights must be universal and apply universally. As the point 
of human rights does seem to require that they be universally 
applied, this appears to make sense. However, without a 
careful examination of the ideas and language used, the idea 
that different cultures would interpret these documents the 
same way (let alone that they would agree with all of the 
ideas espoused by those documents) seems premature. The 
United Nations, with all of the squabbles over specific word 
use, would likely recognize the importance of word use in 
the application of documents (though perhaps, due to 
political power and imbalance, it may not be the best place 
for a truly equal discussion on rights to take place).  
Throughout history, the importance of word choice 
in legal documents has been shown in the differences found 
in different cultures’ interpretations of documents. One 
(perhaps extreme) example is the differences in ideas of 
ownership of land found between the Europeans and the 
Native Americans. While many abuses by the Europeans 
(and eventually Americans) were knowingly perpetrated 
against Native Americans, in the early years of contact there 
were also some honest misunderstandings over land treaties 
due to different definitions of land ownership.  
In Europe (especially England) a great deal of 
importance was placed on private property, with a lot of 
England’s legal doctrine stemming from the idea of the 
primacy of private property rights. Native Americans did not 
have this idea, especially in respect to land use. Some of  
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these differences came out of different styles of land use.8 
The result of these different ideas was that when forming 
treaties about land ownership, the two groups were not even 
having the same conversation. The fact is that things that 
may seem small, like the definition and implications of 
“owning” land, can in fact have far-reaching consequences 
in the implementation and creation of treaties. Especially in 
a conversation with such big implications as human rights 
has, word use should be examined carefully, and the 
implications of different terms should be investigated.   
Finally, the fact that Téson finds the universality of 
human rights treaties surprising is something that I find 
surprising. When dealing with an international arena with 
particular international priorities and pressures, why is it 
surprising that documents created under those politically-
pressured systems are similar in type? In addition, once a 
discourse is started with a particular focus, it can be difficult 
to change that focus (see most discourse on personal identity 
as an example of this phenomenon). In addition, looking 
solely at legal human rights documents seems limiting. 
Many other avenues for discussion exist which can give a 
more complete discussion and evaluation of the human 
rights regime.  
 In the end of Téson’s paper, he argues that there are 
two negative “by-products” of relativism: namely, elitism 
and conspiracy. Elitism from relativism, he says, states that 
“one can appropriately honor human rights in certain  
                                                
8 Merchant, Carolyn, editor. Major Problems in American 
Environmental History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 27. 
For more information about differences in ideas of ownership and 
interactions with land, see “The Ecological Indian” by Shepard Krech II 
and “Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-
1900” by Alfred W. Crosby. 
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societies, usually the most sophisticated ones, but not in 
others, on account, for example, of the latter’s insufficient 
economic development” (389). He states that elitism then 
necessarily follows from relativism. In the second, 
conspiracy, he says states that “the law of human rights 
results from a conspiracy of the West to perpetuate 
imperialism” (389). This, he states, neither inevitably 
follows from, nor is required by, cultural relativism.  
 To the first point, it again seems that Téson is 
making an unfair characterization of relativism. In his 
defense of this view, Téson states that some believe “human 
rights are good for the West, but not for much of the non-
Western world.” He claims that these well-intentioned 
proposals result in deference to tyrannical governments.  
First, this argument seems to assume a universal 
human rights regime. If he is trying to argue against the 
strongest form of relativism, which it seems that he is, they 
would deny the existence of such a universal framework, 
and therefore would not state that Western states can 
participate in human rights while non-Western ones cannot. 
Instead, it seems more likely that they would argue that a 
universal human rights discourse cannot exist, and instead 
that human rights would be different in different societies, 
but not in the sense of people from different places 
deserving more or less rights, but in people from different 
cultural traditions finding different rights and nuances of 
rights important, and taking the implications of these rights 
in different directions. In addition, again looking at history, 
it seems unlikely that relativists who really had an in-depth 
conception of their ideas would take this view. As the point 
of relativism is again tolerance and equal treatment of 
societies, it seems unlikely that such a Western-centric 
viewpoint would be logically necessitated by relativism. 
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The second implication, conspiracy, Téson says does 
not necessarily follow from relativism. I agree with him on 
this point: the idea of human rights as a vehicle for the 
continuation of imperialism does not necessarily follow 
from relativism. While the conspiracy argument can be used 
to excuse the violent or neglectful actions of authoritarian 
governments, it does point out a worry for human rights. 
Because of the fact that human rights are meant to be 
universal, by definition, and because of the fact that such 
rules are meant to supersede state sovereignty, this is a 
legitimate fear (though not a reason to avoid participating in 
the human rights discussion altogether). Looking at the fact 
that human rights is historically a Western-based discourse, 
and that it came right after the dissolution of colonialism, 
seemingly giving Western states yet another reason to 
interfere in the affairs of others, it seems understandable that 
this fear exists. A way to counter this fear is to make sure 
that discussions on human rights, both in law and action, 
bring everyone to the table. If human rights law is truly 
agreed upon, and if human rights law is invoked more often 
than (as some could argue it is today) whenever the West 
feels it will be beneficial (politically or financially) for them, 
then we will be closer to dispelling these fears.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, strong relativism does not make sense 
in a human rights framework, as human rights are supposed 
to be, by definition, universally applicable. In addition, 
strong relativism has troubling implications for international 
law as a whole, and the ability of different cultures to 
participate in constructive dialogue. However, the fact that 
strong relativism is not helpful to the conversation does not  
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mean that the problems and challenges to human rights 
pointed out by relativist discourse as a whole are 
insignificant. Instead of looking to strong relativism, we 
should look at the points made by weak relativism: that 
different cultures have different cultural and ethical 
histories, and that these histories should not be brushed aside 
and ignored, but should instead be examined closely to allow 
us to further intercultural dialogue on subjects such as 
human rights. By examining these differences we will be 
able to ensure that greater agreement is reached and decrease 
instances of cross-cultural misunderstandings. 
In order to ensure that human rights law in its current 
form represents the universal human rights ideals in a truly 
universal way, a detailed examination of the ideas and 
terminology must be undertaken.  Because of the 
complexities of meaning of various terms and the 
importance that word use has on implications for the 
implementation of human rights treaties, it is evident that 
this investigation would be helpful in furthering the human 
rights discussion, allowing more non-Western cultures to 
come to the table. Looking at the ideas that come out of 
weak relativism, it is clear that changes must be made. In a 
further paper, I will argue that an overlapping consensus 
model is the best option for furthering the discussion on 
human rights. However, for this paper I will simply state that 
intercultural dialogue and examination of concepts used in 
human rights documents must take place. For supporters of 
the overlapping consensus model, an investigation of the 
ideas found in human rights documents will allow for an 
attempt at an overlapping consensus system for human 
rights. For those who believe that human rights in its current 
form is truly universal, such an investigation will only serve  
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to solidify their stance (if the results are as they expect), so 
they have nothing to lose from such an enterprise. 
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